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Abstract 
Inhibitory control is the capacity to suppress inappropriate responses. It is regarded as a 
unitary construct, central to executive function and effortful control, as well as many aspects 
of child development. There are, nevertheless, significant gaps in our understanding of 
inhibition’s early development, and several robust findings that remain hard to explain. These 
findings are outlined, and a new perspective on inhibitory control presented, which explains 
them by distinguishing between two ways that inhibitory control is used. According to the 
‘strength/endurance account’, responses which are highly prepotent tax inhibitory strength; 
whereas, those which remain active for a long time tax inhibitory endurance. The review 
considers when and how these aspects of inhibition mature, before discussing their impact 
on development. 
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Introduction 
Inhibitory control is the capacity to suppress an inappropriate prepotent response as 
it arises. It is a domain-general process which is a component of the broader psychological 
constructs of executive function and effortful control. Being able to suppress inappropriate 
prepotent responses – that is, responses which have been triggered despite being 
incompatible with current goals – is central to early development. Evidence from two decades 
of research suggests that inhibitory control undergoes rapid development in early childhood, 
with floor-to-ceiling changes in performance on many inhibitory tasks over the course of a 
few years (Petersen, Hoyniak, Quillian, Bates & Staples, 2016). These improvements in 
inhibitory control underpin important and diverse aspects of development, including changes 
in cognitive, social and emotional domains (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Kim, Nordling, Yoon, 
Bolt & Kochanska, 2013; Murray & Kochanska, 2002).  
While an abundance of correlational research tells us that inhibitory control is 
influential in early development, some fundamental questions about the nature of inhibitory 
control remain unresolved. In this article, we address two of these fundamental questions. 
First, if inhibitory control is a single ability – as is generally held to be the case – then why are 
seemingly similar inhibitory tasks passed by children at such different ages? And second, if 
inhibitory control is a single ability, then why does study after study show that inhibitory tasks 
cluster in two distinct factors, rather than one?  
To consider the first question: by definition, any valid measure of inhibitory control 
should assess children’s ability to suppress an inappropriate response. We might therefore 
expect that such tasks would be passed at similar ages, as children transition from weak 
inhibitory control (when they fail inhibitory tasks) to strong inhibitory control (when they pass 
inhibitory tasks). However, this is not the case. For example, some infant search tasks which 
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tap inhibitory control are passed by around the end of a child’s first year (Diamond & Gilbert, 
1989). Conversely, the Spatial Conflict inhibitory task is typically passed by the child’s third 
birthday (Gerardi-Caulton, 2000). The Day/Night task is not usually passed until around five 
years of age (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994). And the Simon Says task remains challenging 
for many children until their seventh birthday (Strommen, 1973).  
This variability is convincingly shown by a meta-analysis of 198 studies measuring 
children’s inhibitory control (Petersen et al., 2016). This meta-analysis reported data on the 
difficulty of a group of seemingly similar inhibitory tasks. Petersen and colleagues established 
the useful age range of these tasks – that is, the age range at which mean group accuracy was 
between 20% and 80% – and found it to vary widely (see Figure 1 and Table 1). These tasks 
are all regarded as good measures of inhibitory control, and are frequently used. Yet together 
they present a paradox: how can deploying inhibitory control be both simple for most 3-year-
olds (when measured using the Spatial Conflict task), and at the same time challenging for 
many 6-year-olds (when measured with the Simon Says task)? For tasks that supposedly 
measure the same thing, this diversity in performance is striking. One might implicitly assume 
that different tasks require different “amounts” of inhibition; but unless we can explain how 
these differences come about, then we are choosing to ignore, rather than to understand, 
these differences. As we will show, while it is possible to account for much of this diversity 
using current theory, some findings remain hard to explain. 
The second question we address is that, if inhibitory control is a single construct, why 
do factor analyses frequently show that inhibitory tasks load onto two factors, rather than 
one (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Murray & Kochanska, 2002)? This finding has been 
replicated many times, and various proposals have been offered to explain it (e.g., Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Garon, Bryson & Smith, 2008; Zelazo & Mueller, 2002). For example, one 
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proposal distinguishes between “Simple” and “Complex” inhibitory tasks (Garon et al., 2008). 
Simple tasks are those that require children to withhold a single response (e.g., a direct reach 
in a search task – Diamond & Gilbert, 1989), whereas Complex tasks require children to 
choose between alternative ways of responding (e.g. saying “Night” or “Day” on the 
Day/Night task – Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994). This and other accounts have inspired 
extensive experimental work which has contributed greatly to our understanding of early 
development. Nevertheless, as we will discuss, all these accounts struggle to explain 
important aspects of the available data. Thus, the fundamental question of why a single 
construct should load onto two factors remains unresolved. 
In addressing these two questions, we look closely at the ways in which different tasks 
tax inhibitory control, and offer an integrated view of how inhibitory control emerges. This 
will allow us to identify two distinct ways of taxing inhibitory control that we believe must be 
separated, but which have up to now been conflated. To explain why inhibitory tasks (i) vary 
so much in their difficulty, and (ii) load onto two factors rather than one, we first review what 
is currently known about inhibitory development, highlighting a number of unexplained 
findings. We then set out our proposal for how these findings can be explained. Finally, we 
discuss when and how inhibitory control develops, before considering the wider implications 
of the proposal for childhood development. 
 
Question 1: Why do inhibitory tasks differ so much in their difficulty? 
To understand why inhibitory tasks vary so much in their difficulty, we need to 
consider where the need for inhibition comes from in the first place. By definition, inhibitory 
tasks are difficult because they require children to suppress a prepotent response. Knowing 
where prepotency (that is, the need for inhibitory control) comes from is the first step 
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towards understanding why a particular task may be more or less challenging for young 
children. To date, no coherent account has been proposed to explain how prepotent 
responses arise in developmental tasks. To address this issue, we now present a brief 
overview of what is known about how inhibitory demands arise, as a first step towards 
explaining why inhibitory task difficulty varies. As we will show, previous research allows us 
to explain why some tasks are harder than others – but there remain several important 
unexplained findings. 
The best current answer for where prepotency comes from is that it arises through 
the interaction of two task factors. The majority of research on this topic comes from 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC) tasks, a family of inhibitory tasks including the 
Day/Night task (Gerstadt et al., 1994), the Grass/Snow task (Simpson & Riggs, 2009), and the 
Hand Game (Simpson & Riggs, 2011). SRC tasks present children with one of two different 
stimuli, and require them to make one of two responses, over a series of trials (e.g., saying 
“black” to a white card and “white” to a black card). SRC tasks are known to be difficult 
because of a combination of two factors: (i) the strength of the association between the 
stimuli and responses used on the task (e.g., Simpson & Riggs, 2005b; Simpson, Carroll & 
Riggs, 2014, Simpson, Upson & Carroll, 2017), and (ii) the child’s intention to make specific 
responses on the task (e.g., Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 2002; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a; 
Simpson et al., 2012).  
We illustrate how these two factors give rise to a prepotent, to-be-inhibited response 
using the Black/White task as an example (Simpson & Riggs, 2005a; Vendetti, Kamawar, 
Podjarny & Astle, 2015). First, in the Black/White task, there is an obvious, association 
between each stimulus and the to-be-inhibited response: the black card is associated with 
the response “black”, and the white card is associated with the response “white”. Second, the 
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child is told that they will need to make one of two responses: either to say “black”, or to say 
“white”. Because the child intends to make these two specific responses during the task, both 
are primed – that is, partially activated so that they can be made quickly. In consequence, 
when the black card is presented, its association with the primed response of saying “black” 
means that this incorrect response is activated further. This incorrect response of saying 
“black” is thus activated much more than the correct response of saying “white”. In 
consequence, inhibitory control is required to suppress the triggered but incorrect response. 
The greater the gap in activation between the correct and incorrect responses, the greater 
the prepotency, and thus the more inhibitory control is required. Once the incorrect response 
has been suppressed, the child can simply make the correct response instead. 
Performance varies a great deal between the easiest and hardest SRC tasks (Carlson, 
2005; Petersen et al., 2016). For example, based on Petersen and colleagues’ (2016) meta-
analysis, ceiling performance on the Baby Stroop task (Hughes & Ensor, 2005) is typically 
reached by around three years. However, at the same age, performance on the Black/White 
task is at floor: ceiling performance is not reached for another two years. The best current 
explanation for these differences suggests that task difficulty depends principally on the 
strength of association between the stimuli and responses used in these tasks. These 
associations determine the relative activation of the to-be-inhibited and to-be-produced 
responses in each task, and thus the degree of prepotency on the task. 
As an illustration, the Black/White task reflects the maximum difficulty of suppressing 
a prepotent response, we suggest, because the stimuli trigger the to-be-inhibited response 
as much as possible, while triggering the to-be-produced response as little as possible. On 
every trial, the stimulus is strongly associated with (and thus strongly activates) the to-be-
inhibited response, while having very little association with the to-be-produced response. 
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This gap between the activation of the to-be-inhibited and to-be-produced responses means 
the task’s inhibitory demands are maximised. Conversely, on the Baby Stroop task, the 
stimulus on a trial triggers the incorrect response far less. Children are told to say “mommy” 
to a small stimulus, and “baby” to a large stimulus. The labels “mommy” and “baby” are only 
moderately associated with the concepts large and small. As a consequence, because the 
stimuli on the Baby Stroop task are only moderately associated with the to-be-inhibited 
response, that response is activated less strongly. The relative gap in activation between 
responses is therefore reduced, so the inhibitory demands are less, and the task is easier as a 
result. 
So, the difficulty of SRC tasks appears to depend on the difference in activation 
between the to-be-inhibited and to-be-produced responses. As children get older, they 
become able to suppress larger and larger differences in activation – starting with small 
differences in activation on the Baby Stroop task, and ending with much larger differences in 
activation on the Black/White task. We will henceforth refer to this ability to overcome 
increasingly large differences in activation of the to-be-inhibited and to-be-produced 
response as Inhibitory Strength. Thus, as children’s inhibitory strength increases, they become 
able to overcome larger difference in activation of these responses.    
 This account of prepotency can also be applied to the widely discussed distinction 
between Simple and Complex inhibitory tasks (Garon et al., 2008). As previously noted, Simple 
tasks require children to withhold a single response. For example, in the Detour Reach task, 
infants sit in front of a barrier with an object behind it (Diamond, 1990; Diamond & Gilbert, 
1989). In order to get the object, the infant must suppress the single response of making a 
direct reach towards it, and instead make a detour reach around the barrier. In contrast, 
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Complex tasks require children to choose between alternative ways of responding – for 
example, on the Day/Night task, children must select between saying “night” and “day”.  
Complex tasks are typically harder than Simple tasks (Garon et al., 2008). This is 
unsurprising, since they have both greater working memory demands and greater prepotency 
than Simple tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Garon et al., 2008). The need to maintain two 
alternative ways of responding, rather than just one, necessarily means that Complex tasks 
require two rules to be held in working memory. In contrast, Simple tasks involve just a single 
response, so there is no need to maintain multiple rules. Complex tasks also have greater 
prepotency than Simple tasks. In Complex tasks, the to-be-inhibited responses are highly 
prepotent because children intend to make them at some point in the task – this is necessarily 
true, since the to-be-inhibited response on one trial (e.g., saying “black” to a black card) is 
also the to-be-produced response on another trial (saying “black” to a white card). 
Suppressing the to-be-inhibited response in a Complex task taxes inhibitory strength, making 
these tasks difficult for preschoolers. Conversely, in Simple tasks, there is just a single 
response to be inhibited at all times (e.g., making a direct reach). There is no intention to 
make this response during the task; it is therefore not primed; and so its prepotency is low. 
Suppressing the to-be-inhibited responses in Simple tasks therefore requires little inhibitory 
strength, making them relatively easy for preschoolers. 
While much of the variation in inhibitory task difficulty can be explained, there remain 
two important findings which cannot. Both problems relate to a specific type of Simple task. 
While most Simple tasks are passed during infancy or the early preschool years, one group of 
Simple tasks is remarkably challenging for preschoolers. This group of tasks is sometimes 
referred to as “Delay of Gratification” tasks (e.g., Atance & Jackson, 2009; Mischel, 2014; 
Steelandt, Thierry, Broihanne & Dufour, 2012). For example, the Gift Delay task (like all Simple 
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tasks) requires children to suppress a single response – that of looking at a gift while it is being 
wrapped. There are no complicated rules to remember; children only need to remember not 
to look at the gift. Also, this single response should be suppressed for the entire duration of 
the task. So children do not intend to make the response at any point, reducing its prepotency. 
In this sense, the Gift Delay task is clearly a Simple task, and thus makes scant demands on 
inhibitory strength or on working memory. Yet preschool children find the task difficult, and 
failures to suppress the to-be-inhibited response are common. If both prepotency and 
working memory demands are low on this task, why is it – and other Delay of Gratification 
tasks – so difficult for preschool children? 
It is also hard to explain why inhibitory tasks are sometimes made easier when 
children are asked to slow their responding, but are sometimes made more difficult. 
Introducing a delay boosts performance on a range of inhibitory tasks (Diamond et al., 2002; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2007; although see Barker & Munakata, 2015). For example, performance 
on the Day/Night task improves when a delay is inserted between the presentation of a 
stimulus and children’s response (Diamond et al., 2002). However, elsewhere, introducing a 
delay impairs children’s performance. In Delay of Gratification tasks, delay makes it more 
likely that children will fail to suppress the to-be-inhibited response. So, for example, in the 
Marshmallow task children are told that they can either have one treat now, or two treats 
later (Mischel & Metzner, 1962; see Mischel, 2014, for a review). Most children initially resist 
choosing the single treat. Their inhibitory strength seems sufficient to allow this choice. 
Nevertheless, as the delay continues, it becomes increasingly likely that children will fail to 
suppress the to-be-inhibited response of eating the single treat, with preschool children 
struggling to resist for more than about five minutes (Protzko, 2018). Thus, in the 
Marshmallow task, delay makes it harder to suppress the to-be-inhibited response. By 
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definition, inhibitory tasks tap the same construct, so for this simple manipulation to have 
such contrasting effects is striking. 
So while we can account for some of the variation in inhibitory task difficulty, these 
two findings remain unexplained. Even more questions are raised when considering the lack 
of clarity over whether inhibitory control really is one single construct, or two – highlighted 
by the many factor-analytic studies that have studied the development of inhibitory control. 
It is to these studies that we now turn. 
 
Question 2: Why do inhibitory tasks load onto two factors, not one? 
It has long been observed that preschoolers’ performance on inhibitory tasks reliably 
differentiates into two factors (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Murray & Kochanska, 2002). The 
first study to show this was reported by Carlson and Moses (2001). They conducted a 
comprehensive battery study that included ten different measures of inhibitory control. Using 
confirmatory factor analysis, they reported that performance on these tasks was best 
explained by two factors, not one. Thus, tasks that were all supposedly measuring the same 
construct instead appeared to be tapping two different constructs. Subsequent research has 
replicated this finding, and a number of accounts have been offered to try to explain this 
distinction (see Garon, 2016, for a review). However, as we will show, none of these accounts 
can fully explain children’s behaviour across these tasks. 
One commonly cited account suggests that the division of inhibitory tasks into two 
factors reflects a distinction between “hot” and “cool” executive function (e.g., Brock, Rimm-
Kaufman, Nathanson & Grimm, 2009; Kim et al., 2013; Willoughby, Kupersmidt, Voegler-Lee 
& Bryant, 2011). “Hot” executive function is proposed to be used in tasks which have high 
motivational or emotional salience, such as those involving highly desirable rewards (Zelazo 
 12
& Mueller, 2002). For example, in a “hot” Delay of Gratification task, there is a desire for 
immediate gratification. In contrast, “cool” executive function is said to be used with tasks 
without such a motivational component, such as the Day/Night task. The “hot” versus “cool” 
distinction was originally drawn from work with brain-injured adults, who showed atypical 
patterns of performance on elaborate tasks involving gains and losses of rewards (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994). Extending this distinction in seeking to explain the 
development of executive functions in young children might seem a plausible idea, and is one 
that has been cited quite widely. 
Experimental evidence has shown, however, that motivational salience alone is not 
sufficient to make an inhibitory task “hot”. Allan and Lonigan (2011, 2014) conducted an 
elegant factor-analytic study where they created a series of “hot” tasks simply by adding 
motivational salience to “cool”’ tasks (for example, a Grass/Snow task in which children 
received a reward for good performance). Thus, these “hot” and “cool” tasks were very well 
matched for incidental task demands, so that they differed only in terms of motivational 
salience. However, data from both kinds of task were best explained by a single factor, not 
two, indicating that “cool” tasks do not become “hot” simply by adding a reward. Clearly, the 
presence or absence of a strong motivational component does not cause inhibitory tasks to 
load onto two distinct factors.  
An alternative proposal has suggested that what best accounts for inhibitory tasks 
loading onto two factors is the presence (or absence) of motivational conflict (Garon, 2016). 
This term describes the child having two simultaneous but conflicting motivations within a 
single task. So for example, in a Delay of Gratification task, there is conflict between the desire 
for short-term gratification (e.g., getting one sweet now) and the desire to have the largest 
reward possible (getting two sweets later). The suggestion is that tasks involving motivational 
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conflict load onto one factor, and tasks without motivational conflict load onto a separate 
factor. While this account explains most data very well, it cannot explain the findings of 
Carlson and Moses’s (2001) original factor analysis. That study reported data from ten tasks, 
of which only one was high in motivational conflict (the Gift Delay task). The other nine tasks 
involved little or no motivational conflict. Nevertheless, five tasks loaded on one factor (the 
Day/Night, Grass/Snow, Bear/Dragon, Dimensional Change Card Sort, and Whisper tasks) and 
four tasks loaded onto the other factor (the KRISP, Pinball, Tower, and Gift Delay task; the 
tenth task, Spatial Conflict task, loaded on both). So, the two factors must represent 
something other than the presence or absence of motivational conflict. 
In their seminal study, Carlson and Moses (2001) suggested that these two factors were 
distinguished by their working memory demands, with tasks that made high working memory 
demands loading onto one factor, and tasks with low working memory demands loading onto 
a separate factor. However, this distinction provided only a partial explanation of their data. 
For example, the Whisper task, which required children to whisper the names of cartoon 
characters, had particularly low working memory demands (a single rule: “just remember to 
whisper”), but loaded onto the “high working memory” factor. Conversely, the KRISP task, 
which required children to find a precise visual match to a target picture from four similar 
options, had high working memory demands (“keep track of which features you have checked 
in which pictures, and whether those features differ across any of the other three pictures”). 
Nevertheless, this task loaded on the “low working memory” factor. 
There is no doubt that inhibitory tasks load onto two factors. This suggests both that 
the status of inhibitory control as a unitary construct is in doubt, and that we lack a clear 
understanding of why tasks supposedly tapping the same construct appear to be measuring 
two different things. There remain consistent and hard-to-explain discrepancies between the 
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patterns of data observed, and the explanations offered. In short, none of the previous 
explanations can fully explain children’s task performance. 
 
How can we explain these inconsistent findings? Revising our view of inhibitory control. 
To explain both why inhibitory tasks differ so much in difficulty, and why inhibitory 
tasks load onto two factors rather than one, we suggest that what is needed is a fundamental 
rethink about how to-be-inhibited responses tax inhibitory control. We propose that, while 
inhibitory control can rightly be regarded as a single component of executive function, the 
tasks that tap inhibitory control can do so in two distinct ways. This distinction is best 
illustrated by considering the type of response the child needs to inhibit.  
Some measures of inhibitory control require children to suppress a response that is 
highly prepotent (e.g., the Black/White task). Other measures of inhibitory control require 
children to suppress a response that remains active for a long time (several minutes or longer 
– such as on a Delay of Gratification task). Both types of task involve children using inhibitory 
control to suppress an inappropriate response. However, the aspect of inhibitory control 
taxed in each task is importantly different: in the former case, what’s crucial is how strong the 
to-be-inhibited response is, while in the latter case, what’s crucial is for how long the to-be-
inhibited response lasts. We refer to the former category of task as taxing inhibitory strength 
(suppressing responses that are high in prepotency), and the latter category of task as taxing 
inhibitory endurance (suppressing responses that remain active for a long time). This explicit 
separation of inhibitory control tasks into those that tax inhibitory strength and those that 
tax inhibitory endurance – and the characterizing of prepotent responses according to their 
magnitude and their duration – can explain all the discrepant findings presented in this article. 
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This Strength/Endurance account of inhibitory control offers a parsimonious 
explanation for why some Simple tasks are easy, while others are more challenging. We know 
that Simple tasks are low in prepotency, and have low working memory demands, and that 
therefore we would expect them to be easy for most children. However, it is clear that one 
kind of Simple task, the Delay of Gratification task, is difficult for young children. This difficulty 
arises despite Delay of Gratification tasks making little demands on inhibitory strength: most 
preschoolers are well able to suppress the to-be-inhibited response on a Delay of Gratification 
task in the short-term (e.g., Pecora, Addessi, Schino & Bellagamba, 2014), indicating that 
inhibitory strength is not particularly taxed. Failures on Delay of Gratification tasks usually 
arise as the task continues. It is the need to sustain suppression of the to-be-inhibited 
response that makes Delay of Gratification tasks difficult. The key to this difficulty is not how 
prepotent the to-be-inhibited response is, but for how long it must be suppressed. Delay of 
Gratification tasks are difficult not because they tax inhibitory strength, but because they tax 
inhibitory endurance. It is this that makes Delay of Gratification tasks harder than most Simple 
tasks. 
The Strength/Endurance account can also explain the contrasting effects of delay on 
inhibitory tasks. For tasks tapping inhibitory strength, delay makes prepotent responses 
easier to suppress, and so reduces task difficulty (Ling, Wong & Diamond, 2016; Montgomery 
& Koeltzow, 2012; Simpson et al., 2012). Two accounts have been proposed to explain how 
delay makes suppressing prepotent responses easier. The first, the active computation 
account, proposes that delay provides time for the correct response to be actively calculated 
(Diamond et al., 2002). Once the correct response has been worked out, the incorrect 
response loses its prepotency, and the need for inhibitory control is therefore eliminated 
(e.g., in the Black/White task, when a black card is shown, the introduction of a delay provides 
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time for children to work out that the correct response for that trial is to say “white”. This 
knowledge means that the incorrect response of saying “black” loses its prepotency.  
The second account, the passive dissipation account, proposes that delay provides 
time for the incorrect response to passively fade, reducing the need for inhibitory control 
(Simpson & Riggs, 2007). In inhibitory tasks where a prepotent response is triggered by the 
stimulus onset (e.g., presenting a black card in the Black/White task), evidence suggests that 
when a new stimulus is presented, the activation of the associated incorrect response is 
transitory (Ambrosi, Servant, Blaye & Burle, 2019; Iani, Stella & Rubichi, 2014). Introducing a 
delay allows time for this incorrect response to pass its peak activation and fade, so that less 
inhibitory control is then required to suppress it. These two accounts are not mutually 
exclusive. But irrespective of the precise mechanism, delay reduces the activation of the to-
be-inhibited response in tasks which tax inhibitory strength, and in doing so improves 
performance. 
In contrast, on tasks that tap inhibitory endurance, neither of these possible 
mechanisms can arise. On Delay of Gratification tasks, for example, the activation of the to-
be-inhibited response can’t be eliminated simply by working out the appropriate response – 
if a child wants to eat the marshmallow, then working out that the appropriate response is to 
not eat the marshmallow does nothing to eliminate that desire. Similarly, the activation of 
the to-be-inhibited response does not passively fade away. A child that wants to eat the 
marshmallow in front of them (i.e., a child that is motivated to produce the to-be-inhibited 
response) will continue to experience that motivation even after time has passed. Thus, on 
Delay of Gratification tasks, the prepotency of the to-be-inhibited response (though modest) 
does not diminish over time. On the contrary, as the delay continues, the risk of failure 
accumulates, and so delay impairs performance on these tasks. 
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The Strength/Endurance account also provides a simple and effective explanation for 
why inhibitory tasks load onto two factors in factor-analytic studies. We propose that what 
distinguishes these two factors is whether the task in question taxes inhibitory strength or 
inhibitory endurance. Rather than describing these two factors as “hot” versus “cool”, or 
“motivational conflict” versus “no motivational conflict”, or “high working memory” versus 
“low working memory”, we suggest they are best considered as “taxes inhibitory strength” 
versus “taxes inhibitory endurance”. In other words, does the task require children to briefly 
resist a highly prepotent response, or does it require them to overcome a response that is 
less prepotent but lasts a long time? The “inhibitory strength” factor comprises tasks such as 
the Day/Night task and the Whisper task, in which the to-be-inhibited response receives 
strong activation that lasts a short time – taxing strength, but not endurance. In contrast, the 
“inhibitory endurance” factor comprises tasks such as the Gift Delay task and the KRISP task, 
in which the prepotency of the to-be-inhibited response is more modest but lasts for a longer 
time – taxing endurance, but not strength. Table 2 offers a suggested taxonomy of the 
strength and endurance demands made by some common measures of inhibitory control. 
While these tasks do appear to principally tax either strength or endurance, in theory it should 
be possible for a task to tax both. 
Importantly, the Strength/Endurance account can explain findings that other accounts 
cannot. For example, Allan and Lonigan (2011, 2014) tested two sets of tasks that differed in 
their motivational component, and found that both sets loaded onto a single factor. This is 
inconsistent with the “hot”/“cool” account, but entirely consistent with the Strength/ 
Endurance account, which suggests that these tasks should load on a single factor, since they 
all tap inhibitory strength. Likewise, the Strength/Endurance account can explain the 
otherwise anomalous finding from Carlson and Moses’s (2001) factor-analysis study – in 
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particular, why the Whisper task loads on the same factor as the Day/Night task, and the 
KRISP task loads on the same factor as the Gift Delay task. In the Whisper task, children must 
briefly suppress their tendency to respond with their typical voice as each new stimulus is 
presented. In consequence, this task requires brief suppression, and loads on the inhibitory 
strength factor (as does the Day/Night task). In the KRISP task, children must delay making a 
response while they work through the four pictures searching for differences between these 
pictures and the target picture. Thus, this task taxes inhibitory endurance, and loads with the 
Gift Delay task. 
The studies by Carlson and Moses (2001) and Allan and Lonigan (2011, 2014) greatly 
enhance our understanding of why inhibitory tasks load onto two factors, in large part 
because of their clear methodological descriptions. An examination of other factor-analytic 
studies suggests that their data are often less straightforward to interpret. A common 
problem is that tasks are not described in sufficient detail to determine whether they tax 
inhibitory strength or inhibitory endurance. This is perhaps not surprising, since the authors 
would have been unaware of this particular distinction, and cannot be criticised for not 
anticipating it. Nevertheless, difficulties in interpreting the data remain.  
As an example, on the Tower task – a Go/No Go variant – children take turns with an 
experimenter adding blocks to a tower. This task might be assumed to tax inhibitory strength, 
and as such, should be expected to load with the Day/Night task, and not the Gift Delay task. 
However, the picture gleaned from the data is not so straightforward. The Tower task has 
variously been reported to load with the Day/Night task (Pauli-Pott, Dalir, Mingebach, Roller 
& Becker, 2014); with the Gift Delay task (Carlson & Moses, 2001); or with both, in a single 
factor (Denham, Warren-Khot, Bassett, Wyatt, & Perna, 2012). We suggest that whether the 
Tower task taxes inhibitory strength or inhibitory endurance depends on how it is 
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administered. Crucially, on No-go trials, how long does the experimenter wait before adding 
a block? If the block is added quickly, the task may tax inhibitory strength; if it is added after 
a longer delay, it may tax inhibitory endurance. Many studies do not describe the Tower task 
(or other tasks) in sufficient detail to determine which aspect of inhibition is being taxed. 
Greater clarity on this point will be essential in future studies.   
The proposal that the two inhibitory factors are best distinguished by considering the 
temporal aspect of the child’s response is not entirely new. Indeed, many previous accounts 
note that tasks which load on one of the two factors require children to sustain suppression 
of a prepotent response over time. Carlson and Moses (2001) suggested that tasks which 
loaded on their “low working memory” factor required children to delay responding. Likewise, 
Allan and Lonigan (2014, p43) suggested that “hot” tasks required children to delay 
responding (in addition, these tasks involve to-be-inhibited responses with high motivational 
salience). Garon (2016) proposed that “hot” tasks required children to resolve motivational 
conflict between short- and long-term goals, which inherently requires delaying responding 
in order to achieve the long-term goal. By our account, inhibitory endurance is simply the 
ability to achieve the ongoing suppression of an inappropriate prepotent response. Thus, 
proposing inhibitory endurance as a distinct factor from inhibitory strength provides a 
succinct explanation of why inhibitory tasks load onto two separate factors. 
 
How do inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance develop? 
Acquiring a better understanding of how these two distinct ways of using inhibitory 
control develop should be a primary goal for future research. To that end, we outline briefly 
what is currently known about the development of inhibitory strength and inhibitory 
endurance. 
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There is considerable evidence to suggest that inhibitory strength improves through 
infancy and into early childhood (e.g., Carlson, 2005; Garon et al., 2008; 2016; Petersen et al., 
2016). Put simply, what develops is the ability to suppress responses of greater and greater 
prepotency. The first measures of inhibitory strength to be mastered are infant-appropriate 
Simple tasks, such as the Detour reach task (Diamond & Gilbert, 1989). In these tasks, 
inhibitory demands are particularly modest, as children do not intend to make the to-be-
inhibited responses in these tasks (e.g., making a direct reach). These tasks are generally 
passed by around 12 months. Children next become able to cope with the inhibitory demands 
of Complex tasks, such as the Baby Stroop task (resist saying “baby” to a picture of a small 
cup – Hughes & Ensor, 2005). These tasks make moderate demands on inhibitory strength, 
because of the weak stimulus-response associations on the task (i.e., the word “baby” is only 
moderately associated with the concept small). Finally, children become able to pass the most 
demanding tests of inhibitory strength, in which children are required to resist strong 
stimulus-response associations (e.g., resisting saying “black” to a black card in the 
Black/White task – Simpson & Riggs, 2005a). 
 Thus, inhibitory strength typically increases until around the end of the fifth year, 
when it reaches broadly adult-like levels. At this age, children are unlikely to make an error 
because of poor inhibitory strength. Nevertheless, children older than five years can still make 
errors on such tasks – this is particularly likely to occur when task cues are difficult to monitor. 
For example, the Simon Says task taps inhibitory strength, yet remains difficult for many 5-
year-olds (Strommen, 1973). On this Go/No-go variant, children are told to follow the 
experimenter’s instructions on Go trials, but not on No-go trials. Both the Go and No-go cues 
are presented by the same instructor, in the same tone of voice. The only thing that 
distinguishes them are the words “Simon says…”, placed before Go trials. Many 5-year-olds 
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find this task difficult because they struggle to detect the no-go cue (i.e., the absence of the 
words “Simon Says…” – Marshall & Drew, 2014; see also Winter & Sheridan, 2014). This 
difficulty with cue monitoring arises not just in measures of inhibitory control, but across a 
range of executive functions (see, Chevalier, 2015, for a review). For example, children 
struggle to identify non-transparent switch cues on tests of cognitive flexibility (e.g., 
Chevalier, Wiebe, Huber & Espy, 2011). Nevertheless, while cue monitoring can remain a 
challenge, we suggest that by about five years of age an important milestone is reached in 
inhibitory development: at this age, typically developing children have sufficient inhibitory 
strength to stop any prepotent response. 
An important aim for future research is to identify the mechanisms that underpin 
developmental improvements in inhibitory strength. We suggest that both improvements in 
capacity and improvements in strategy should be considered. On the first point, the 
development of inhibitory strength may involve increases in the capacity to directly reduce 
the activation of to-be-inhibited responses. This is the prevailing view in the adult literature: 
this overt stopping function is thought to arise within a specific neural pathway – one 
deploying the prefrontal cortex, in conjunction with the basal ganglia (see Aron, Robbins & 
Poldrack, 2004, 2014). Most adult research on inhibitory control uses Go/No-go tasks 
(particularly the Stop-Signal variant – e.g., Aron et al., 2003). As with developmental tasks, 
adult Go/No-go tasks require the brief suppression of prepotent responses. The most 
parsimonious way to reconcile the adult and developmental literatures is to propose that 
Go/No-go tasks tax inhibitory strength in both adults and children. From this perspective, 
improvements in inhibitory strength during development could be explained by the 
maturation of the fronto-basal-ganglia networks (Rubia, Smith, Taylor, & Brammer, 2007; 
Smith et al., 2017).  
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An alternative strategic mechanism to explain improvements in inhibitory strength 
proposes that children learn to slow their responding in tasks in which they detect the 
presence of an inappropriate prepotent response (Simpson et al., in press). This view suggests 
that inhibitory strength increases as children acquire a “slow down” strategy, rather than as 
the product of increasing capacity for overtly stopping. 
Understanding the development of inhibitory endurance is less straightforward, as 
to do so we first need to identify which tasks best measure this aspect of inhibitory control. 
Most of the data concerning the development of inhibitory endurance has come from Delay 
of Gratification tasks. However, there are several different types of Delay of Gratification task, 
and so we need to consider which type measures inhibitory endurance the best. Recently, 
useful steps have been taken in this regard: Garon (2016) identified three categories of Delay 
of Gratification task, labelled Choice, Wait and Temptation tasks. Choice tasks typically 
present children with a series of decisions in which they choose between receiving a small 
treat now, or a larger treat later. In Wait tasks, children are placed in front of a desirable 
reward, and told that if they wait until the experimenter returns, they will receive a larger 
reward. In Temptation tasks, children are asked to suppress a response to a tempting stimulus 
(for example, they are told not to look while an exciting gift is being wrapped). On Choice and 
Wait tasks, successful waiting means the child gets a larger reward, while on Temptation 
tasks, successful waiting means the child receives social approval.  
All of these tasks involve some form of temporal judgement about rewards. However, 
we suggest that only Wait tasks and Temptation tasks measure inhibitory endurance, since 
unlike Choice tasks, they place children in a waiting situation that continues over time. The 
tasks involve a wait during which the child must maintain the suppression of a prepotent 
response. While Choice tasks oblige the child to make a one-off selection between 
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alternatives – a smaller reward now, or a larger reward later – there is little need for inhibitory 
endurance. As the decision is made at a single moment in time, there is no opportunity to 
rescind it, and so no need to maintain that choice. 
Based on the data from Wait and Temptation tasks, it is clear that inhibitory 
endurance improves during the preschool years (e.g., Atance & Jackson, 2009; Mischel, 2014; 
Steelandt et al., 2012; Pecora et al., 2014). However, at present the literature does not allow 
us to draw precise conclusions about its developmental trajectory. It was only possible to 
make precise proposals concerning the development of inhibitory strength because of the 
recent meta-analysis of Petersen and colleagues (2016), which considered development over 
several years across many tasks. A similar meta-analysis of Delay of Gratification tasks is 
needed before such proposals can be made about the development of inhibitory endurance.  
Despite the limitations of the current data, we speculate that the development of 
inhibitory endurance is likely to be considerably more protracted than inhibitory strength. 
Delay of Gratification tasks require children to use their inhibitory endurance to resist 
tempting stimuli. There is evidence that even adults’ inhibitory endurance is sometimes 
insufficient to resist particularly strong temptations (Park, Peterson & Seligman, 2006; 
Tsukayama, Duckworth & Kim, 2012). Since adults’ capacity to resist temptation is far from 
perfect, it will be an important challenge for developmental researchers to track how 
inhibitory endurance develops – and in particular to determine when “adult” levels of 
endurance are reached.   
Finally, how do improvements in inhibitory endurance come about? There is evidence 
that with age, children increasingly use strategies to resist responding on tests of inhibitory 
endurance (for example, they resist playing with a forbidden toy by engaging in distracting 
activities: Pecora et al., 2014). Use of this “distracting” strategy increases with age, consistent 
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with the idea that improvements in inhibitory endurance involve an increase in strategy use. 
However, there is also evidence from the adult literature to suggest that tasks which tax 
inhibitory endurance can activate the fronto-basal-ganglia networks described above (e.g., 
Abi-Jaoude et al., 2018; Berman et al., 2012). If these networks are involved with inhibitory 
endurance, then it is plausible to suggest that their maturation leads to an increased capacity 
for inhibitory endurance. The protracted development of inhibitory endurance is consistent 
with changes in both strategy use and capacity driving improvement at different ages, though 
it is for future research to comprehensively address this issue. 
 
The real-world importance of inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance 
The distinction drawn between inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance is not 
merely useful for describing performance on lab-based tasks. It also has clear relevance to 
important real-world outcomes. Both inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance are 
associated with important – but different – aspects of cognitive, social and emotional 
development. In preschool children, inhibitory strength is associated with several different 
kinds of reasoning, as well as with a range of early academic outcomes. In contrast, inhibitory 
endurance is associated with both concurrent and later measures of self-regulation, with 
measures of behavioural adjustment and emotional regulation, and with academic outcomes 
in adolescence. As we now illustrate, the Strength/Endurance distinction is likely to have 
impact well beyond the study of inhibitory control itself. 
Improvements in inhibitory strength are associated with the development of a range 
of preschool cognitive abilities. These abilities include theory of mind (Carlson & Moses, 
2001), counterfactual reasoning (Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon & Gryg, 2011), lying and deception 
(Evans, Xu & Lee, 2011), symbolic reasoning (Sabbagh, Moses & Shiverick, 2006), strategic 
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reasoning (Carroll, Riggs, Apperly, Graham & Geoghegan, 2012), and drawing (Riggs, Jolley & 
Simpson, 2013). The development of inhibitory strength has also been associated with 
performance on more general measures of academic ability, particularly those relating to 
mathematics in early to middle childhood (Allan, Hume, Allan, Farrington & Lonigan, 2014; 
Bull, Espy & Wiebe, 2008; Cragg & Gilmore, 2013). Conversely, improvements in inhibitory 
endurance are particularly associated with the development of self-control. Self-control is a 
broad construct, defined as the capacity to regulate behaviour, thought, and emotion 
(Bandura, 1989; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). Preschoolers’ 
inhibitory endurance predicts subsequent outcomes on wide-ranging measures of self-
control (e.g., Kochanska, Coy & Murray, 2001). Effective inhibitory endurance is also 
associated with behavioural adjustment (Kim et al., 2014), peer co-operation (Bassett, 
Denham, Wyatt, Warren-Khot, 2012) and the absence of ADHD symptoms (Pauli-Pott et al., 
2014). Finally, inhibitory endurance is associated with academic outcomes in adolescence, 
when educational achievement depends more on self-control than reasoning ability 
(Duckworth & Seligman, 2005). 
 Performance on tasks which measure inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance 
usually correlate. However, when this covariance is removed, it is often found that the 
predictive value of inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance are exclusive: domains whose 
performance is predicted by inhibitory strength are not predicted by inhibitory endurance, 
and vice versa (see Garon, 2016, for a review). Consequently, maintaining this distinction 
between two ways of taxing inhibitory control offers both greater precision and greater 
explanatory power than treating all measures of inhibitory control as equivalent. For example, 
for both Theory of Mind tasks and measures of strategic reasoning, children’s performance is 
significantly associated with measures of inhibitory strength, but not with inhibitory 
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endurance (Bellagamba et al., 2015; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Davis & Leach, 2005). 
Conversely, for behavioural problems and social-emotional aspects of school readiness, 
children’s performance is associated with measures of inhibitory endurance, but not 
inhibitory strength (Bassett et al., 2012; Mann, Hund, Hesson-McInnis & Roman, 2017; 
Mulder, Hoofs, Verhagen, van der Veen & Leseman, 2014).  
Importantly, the Strength/Endurance account can explain why the precise pattern of 
relations described above comes about. Performance on tasks taxing inhibitory strength is 
associated with domains that require the brief suppression of inappropriate prepotent 
responses (e.g., reasoning). Conversely, performance on tasks taxing inhibitory endurance is 
associated with domains which require the sustained suppression of inappropriate prepotent 
responses (e.g., emotion regulation). 
To illustrate: inhibitory strength is used to overcome briefly activated prepotent 
responses, such as those often found in reasoning tasks. In such tasks, the incorrect response 
is only briefly activated, because it loses its prepotency once the correct response is known. 
Consider Counterfactual Reasoning tasks (Beck et al., 2009; Drayton, Turley-Ames & 
Guajardo, 2011) where children are asked how the location of an object would be different if 
the past had also been different (e.g., “What if the car had gone the other way, which garage 
would it be in?”). Asking the counterfactual question about the car’s location draws a child’s 
attention to its current location – making this a prepotent, but incorrect, response. However, 
once a child has calculated the correct counterfactual response – of selecting the other garage 
– then the prepotency of the incorrect response disappears. In this way, this and other 
reasoning tasks usually contain briefly activated to-be-inhibited responses. When reasoning 
can eliminate incorrect responses, they can be briefly resisted (prior to this elimination) with 
inhibitory strength.   
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Conversely, inhibitory endurance is used to overcome more persistent prepotent 
responses. For example, emotional regulation can require children to control behaviour 
which arises from their negative emotions (e.g., feelings of frustration that might lead them 
to give up on a difficult maths task). In general, there are no simple ways to make such 
negative emotions go away – they can rarely be made to disappear just by reasoning about 
them (see Gross, 2015, for a review). Instead, negative emotions often have to be tolerated, 
and this calls for inhibitory endurance, to provide sustained resistance to the inappropriate 
actions that they engender. Similarly, self-control requires sustained resistance to desires for 
immediate gratification: desires which cannot easily be escaped through reason (see 
Duckworth & Seligman, 2015, for a review). When reasoning cannot eliminate inappropriate 
responses, their sustained presence must be borne with inhibitory endurance.   
 
Conclusion 
This article identified two unanswered questions about the development of inhibitory 
control: why do inhibitory tasks differ so much in difficulty, and why do they load onto two 
factors, not one? We propose that both questions can be answered by recognising that, while 
inhibitory control is a single construct, it can be taxed in two different ways. The first way, 
which we refer to as inhibitory strength, reflects the need to suppress highly prepotent 
responses. The second, which we refer to as inhibitory endurance, reflects the need to 
suppress prepotent responses that last a long time.  
Making explicit the distinction between inhibitory strength and endurance gives new 
coherence to our understanding of inhibitory development. It explains varying performance 
across tasks, and resolves previously problematic findings from factor-analytic studies. 
Inhibitory strength is associated with the development of reasoning and early academic 
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ability. In contrast, inhibitory endurance is associated with self-control, behavioural/ 
emotional adjustment and later academic achievement. Inhibitory control is a domain-
general process that has a significant role in many diverse aspects of child development. 
Having a better understanding of what we are actually asking children to do when we 
administer particular measures of inhibitory control will improve research across a range of 
developmental domains, and will give researchers clearer and better grounds for selecting 
tasks in future.  
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Table 1. A summary of the methods used in the tasks shown in Figure 1 (tasks presented in 
approximate increasing order of difficulty). 
 
Task Task type Method 
Spatial 
Conflict 
 
SRC Stimuli are presented on left/right of a monitor. Child 
responds by selecting left/right key. On inhibitory trials, the 
stimulus is on the opposite side from correct response key. 
Baby Stroop 
 
SRC Child says small object belongs to “mommy”; and big 
object belongs to “baby”. 
Shape 
Stroop 
SRC Child points to pictures of small object embedded within 
pictures of larger, different object. 
Bear/Dragon 
 
Go/No-go Child follows commands from the bear puppet, but ignores 
commands from the dragon puppet. 
Tower Go/No-go Child takes turns with an experimenter to add blocks to a 
tower. 
Reverse Sort 
 
SRC Child sorts card A into tray labeled with card B; and card B 
into tray labeled with card A. 
Hand Game 
 
SRC Child sees gesture A, makes gesture B; and sees gesture, B 
makes gesture B (making finger or fist). 
Knock/Tap 
 
SRC Child sees gesture A, makes gesture B; and sees gesture, B 
makes gesture B (hitting table with open/closed hand) 
Grass/Snow 
 
SRC Child points to card B when experimenter say A; and to 
points to card A when experimenter say B. 
Day/Night 
 
SRC 
 
Child sees picture A says B; and sees picture B says A. 
Simon Says 
 
Go/No-go Child performs action only when preceded by “Simon 
says…” (hears command and sees action). 
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Table 2. The relative demands for inhibitory strength and inhibitory endurance made by some 
common developmental tasks. 
 
Task Inhibitory strength 
demands 
Inhibitory endurance 
demands 
Black/White, Day/Night, Grass/Snow, 
Whisper  
high low 
Baby Stroop, Bear/Dragon, Shape Stroop, 
Spatial Conflict 
moderate low 
Forbidden Toy, Gift Delay, KRISP, 
Marshmallow 
low high 
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Figure 1. The relative difficulty of Inhibitory tasks. The ‘useful age range’ describes the age 
range in which group accuracy was between 20% and 80% (from Petersen et al., 2016).  
 
   
 
SC: Spatial Conflict (Gerardi-Caulton, 2005); BS: Baby Stroop (Hughes & Ensor, 2005); SS: 
Shape Stroop (Kochanska et al., 1997); RS: Reverse Categorization (Carlson et al., 2004); 
Tower, (Kochanska et al., 1996); BD: Bear/Dragon (Jones et al., 2003); HG: Hand Game 
(Simpson & Riggs, 2011); GS: Grass/Snow task (Simpson & Riggs, 2009); KT: Knock/Tap 
(Korkman et al., 1998); DN: Day/Night task (Gerstadt et al., 1994); Simon: Simon Says 
(Matthews & Drew, 2014). 
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